Re: AMD planning 45nm 12-Core 'Istanbul' Processor ?

Robert Myers wrote:

> On May 27, 5:31 am, Sebastian Kaliszewski
> <s.usun...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>> Robert Myers wrote:
>> >> Your constant insisting on comparability of risk estimation in long
>> >> term capital and software only shows your lack of clue.
>>
>> > Look.
>>
>> > I didn't go there.
>>
>> Of course you did. Thats you not me who can't see the obvious
difference.
>>
> Why did you ever say that the financial institutions you work for know
> how to estimate risk?  Manifestly, they don't.

Manifestly they do.

> Why should I accept 
> that they are wizards on risk in a field that is not their specialty
> (software) when they screw up so badly in a field that *is* their
> specialty (securities)?  The expert on software risk here is *you*,
> not the people you work for.

They are experts of business risk, including risk a software has for their
business weighted against not having that software, and having similar
functionality but for 10 times the price and having to wait for much
longer
for it. Especially when your competition wants to do the same, time to
market is a key factor. And that's the reality.


>> > You said the people you work for know what they're doing.
>>
>> Because it's obvious. They would be nonexistant if they didn't.
>>
>> Besides I do not work for American financial company, so your nonsense
>> does not apply even if there would be no difference between markets and
>> software.
>>
> The day may come when Eastern Europe drives financial markets.  I
> don't think we're their yet.  Your arguments become ever more arcane.
> Well, they may not know how to estimate *American* risk, but they know
> how to estimate *Polish* risk.

Well, the institution is not Polish. It prospers. So talk about European
risk. 


>> > Look.  You are either so wrapped up in what you're doing that you
>> > can't see what's going on around you, or you're playing stupid.  This
>> > isn't a security forum, so there's no point in discussing the nearly
>> > universal agonizing over security threats due to software
>> > vulnerability.
>>
>> Uh, oh.
>>
> I can't even imagine what to say to you.  You think it's all funny.

The funny stuff is our performance here.



>> > Financial software, online or off, is subject to the same kinds of
>> > problems that NASA discovered.
>>
>> Yeah. The finacial software will explode releasing about equivalent of
>> 1kt TNT of energy due to failed o-ring.
>>
> Let's see.  Pulling some numbers about the latest debt obligation
> screwup.  Moody's (not S&P, my error) overrated about $4 billion in
> debt.  One estimate of loss was about 40%.  I'll use $2 million for
> the value of a human life.  The cost of the screwup was about 2000
> lives lost.  But, you sputter, no lives were actually lost?  Think
> again.  Maybe not 2000 lives right away, but some pretty quickly, as
> people discover that a key asset lost 40% of its value practically
> overnight.  How many car bombs does it take to kill 2000 people?

Another Robert has already answered that better than I could.


>> > What the shuttle disasters and the World Trade Center attack taught
is
>> > that there are more ways for things to go wrong than you can think of
>>
>> So your proposed way of (not) making a software would not help either.
>>
> I'll stand by my original position.  Less software is, almost by
> definition, better software.

And no software means unbelivably good software, as elements of empty set
have any property you want.

You have no grip in reality. In reality what matters is good enough
software
for low enough price. But you don't get it. And I'm loosing hope you ever
will.


>> > and that apparently acceptable risks can have enormous consequences.
>>
>> Risk of loosing shuttle and astronauts was and still is the
"acceptable"
>> risk for NASA.
> 
> You really don't know the history of the shuttle program.  Being a
> shuttle crew member has proven to be riskier than being a combat pilot
> in World War II.

And you pulled that number from what?

Anyways, current life expectancy of combat airplane mission in case of
more-or-less equal powers at war is 1.5, while its 50 for shuttle. That is
a big difference.


> Had that been understood at the beginning, the 
> design would have been canned.

They would go for a better & safer design with lesser capacity (as
originally planned, but military wanted high capacity space truck).


> As it is, the US will be without 
> manned space flight capability for several years.

Not for the first time. Besides they do acklowledge that risk is about 2%
(as historical records show) and still fly.

> Imagine how heads 
> would have rolled if that outcome had been foreseen.

Shuttle is the most trustworthy human space trans****tation system despite
two fatal incidents. The comparable one is russian Souyz, but it also had
it's death toll.


[...]
Sebastian Kaliszewski
-- 
"Never underestimate the power of human stupidity" -- L. Lang